

**CONFIDENTIAL**

03 0383-72

30 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : International Narcotics Control Interagency  
Training Program

1. Background. The idea of this course was born in April 1972 when Mr. Egil Krogh, Executive Director of the CCINC, wrote the other members of the Committee, suggesting that specialized training for officers of those services going on overseas assignments be undertaken, allowing for appropriate contributions by State, CIA, AID/Public Safety and others. The task of putting the course together fell to the Foreign Service Institute, which put Mr. Ray Chambers of its staff into the coordinator's role under the supervision of Mr. Donald Bergus, Dean of Academic Relations at the FSI. A series of meetings was held between the training officers of the participating organizations to work out the curriculum and try and foresee the proper emphasis for the students, all of whom were experienced in their fields in domestic operations, but few of whom had served abroad. At the outset it was determined that the course should be geographically framed, and the first running was planned for those concerned with Latin America. The Agency's contribution was based on a rather ambitious-sounding request from Director Ingersoll, but was whittled down considerably to a two-day session.

2. Class Composition. A profile and roster of the class is appended here as Attachment A. The State and AID officers were expected to attend only the Operational Training phase of the course, but only two officers from each did attend that portion. It had been the intention that outgoing Narcotics Coordinators - usually DCM's - would attend as a matter of course. Neither of the two State officers was specifically

EX-2 IMPDET  
WN-SISAMT



0-113807

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

slated for such an assignment; and one of them did not have an impending overseas assignment. None of the Customs officers attending had been given an assignment and most did not know whether or when they would receive one. The BNDD officers expected to be sent out soon and some already had their assignments. A few officers of both organizations had had at least overseas TDY experience, but only one appeared to have had a PCS assignment, and that in Vietnam. Customs officers, in the main had had experience working with Mexican authorities on the border.

3. The (Non-Agency) Curriculum. As the schedule (Attachment B) shows, the course was organized into three major parts: General Orientation - to explain the purpose of the course and the role of the different agencies involved in the narcotics fight at home and abroad; Operational Training - devoted to familiarizing the students with the new tools, organizations and procedures with which they would be dealing overseas; and Area Familiarization - giving them a bird's eye view of the institutions and culture of Latin America. Operations School officers monitored most of the General Orientation segment in order to have a clear picture of the field setting being given to the students, as well as to get - particularly from senior BNDD and Customs officials - an understanding of their new role as they saw it. It had been hoped that an Embassy coordinator from Latin America would be supplied by State, but that was not possible, and that session was supplanted. Unfortunately also, the BNDD official who was to speak on his agency's role in the new cooperative effort was new in his job, having only recently returned from Southeast Asia. His presentation was little more than war stories and gave neither the Customs students nor the other non-BNDD personnel present any feeling for how BNDD understood the changes in its mission. Mr. Shanley from Customs was much more on target and used the State-issued directive to outline the job Customs officers would have, although he did not seem to get much more specific than the directive itself. Former Ambassador Berger, who had been DCM in Vietnam, failed to take account of the inexperience of his audience and this did not leave an organized impression of the role of the Ambassador and the Country Team other than to convey unmistakably the message that the Ambassador is the monarch whose wishes must be obeyed because of his presidentially given mandate. This was of little help to men who were trying to understand where they would fit into a coordinated picture. [redacted] gave a brief but clear statement of how the Agency became involved in the narcotics picture; our operational doctrine as it applies to this kind of operation; described the Intelligence Sub-Committee in Washington and

25X1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

cited our three-fold field responsibility: the collection of foreign narcotics intelligence, the support of diplomatic efforts to activate host governments in the anti-drug fight, and the coordination of clandestine narcotics intelligence operations abroad. He fielded several questions well and student reaction was good.

4. Agency Contribution. An outline of our two days on Narcotics Intelligence Collection Abroad is Attachment C to this report. The title was somewhat misleading, but it was done this way for security reasons, since the schedule was unclassified and we had no way of knowing how the students would handle the schedule. DC/OS/ST was the coordinator for the two CIA days and introduced all speakers and their topics. C/OS was present for the two days taking critical notes and answering a variety of questions which arose. In some cases we had two or three monitors present listening to topics related to their own presentations.

5. Student Reaction. CIA was treated very gingerly by the course coordinator in the critique (Attachment D) to the extent that our speakers and presentations were not evaluated individually as were the others in the course. Nevertheless, students were asked to comment on the two-day block as a unit. These comments are Attachment E to this report. They reflect in the main that insofar as the class could judge, we accomplished our mission. Two officers commented on our insinuating people into the classrooms and rest rooms, apparently feeling we were spying on them. This was unfortunate, and certainly unintentional, but was a reflection of our interest in trying to determine that we were getting across. We haven't yet figured out how to stay out of the rest rooms. There is little question but that Agency speakers over-stressed the "need to know" principle, beginning with the film of the same name and continuing too frequently thereafter. Likewise the criticism was valid that too little time was left for questions and discussion. One student commented he did not think CIA would cooperate in the field as the class had been assured we would. This perhaps reflects an underlying concern on the part of both BNDD and Customs, particularly the latter, that someone will take them over. There was a good deal of this kind of rumor floating around, which came to our attention over lunch or during breaks. Despite our protests that this could not in any event be us since we specifically were exempted from either a domestic or executive action role, they seemed to believe the present dispersed approach did not make sense and someone would eventually absorb them. They were particularly concerned about being absorbed by their rival agency. Class reaction was

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

fairly lively except where too little question time was left by the speakers. Overall we feel we answered satisfactorily most of the questions raised.

6. Self-Criticism and Future Plans.

a. In general, there was too little coordination among our speakers. OTR speakers were consistent among themselves, but not with the WH speakers. The WH contingent had not been conscious enough of what went before them, thus leading to unnecessary repetition of points already made.

b. Our timing was enough off that we did not cover sufficiently the all-important matter of operational security overseas. This is being rectified in the next running.

c. In an effort not to give away too much, our language was sometimes vague and ambiguous. Attention is being given to this for the next session and we will continue to enjoin our guest speakers to avoid Agency vernacular. We will also use more specific examples, even fictional ones, in an effort to give the presentations more body.

d. The Mexican border experiences of the Customs people made the hour on liaison appear too basic to some of the students and some of them felt there was little difference between our operational philosophy and their own experience except for the "long haul" aspects of our operations. This was, however, a well organized talk and probably should be changed mainly by the addition of some illustrations and more time for discussion.

e. We accurately foresaw the areas of greatest interest to the students - the functioning of the source registry, what we could specifically do for them, their use of our communications and the extent to which they could call on our indices. The communications area is still a relatively foggy one for the students, primarily because they are troubled by the prospect of having the Embassy Narcotics Coordinator hold up their cables. Use of our communications is not a legitimate answer to this problem and we so informed them. Misgivings were expressed by the class over our control of the source registry, or indeed

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1000000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

anyone's control of it. They had great difficulty with the idea of identifying their sources to another organization, particularly when that organization would not reciprocate. They clearly feared compromise to their rival agency, and only rather lengthy discussion seemed to convince them that this service can be and is rendered securely and impartially.

f. The hour on Agency intelligence reporting and how to understand and handle our reports under established control procedures was less than satisfactory. This is an area in which problems have arisen in the field and one we will deal with more precisely in the next course.

g. The second running is following so closely on the heels of the first that there will be little time for major changes. Thereafter, however, we expect to cut back our portion of the course to not more than a day and a half and perhaps less, assuming our conclusions after the second running bear out our current views.


7. Remarks. As it is presently constituted, this course is designed to train not only Customs and BNDD personnel, but Embassy Narcotics Coordinators as well. There is apparently a great disparity among the agencies as to the conditions under which they will assign students to the course. BNDD has about 120 slots overseas and appears to be assigning students on the basis of anticipated replacement needs, five in the first course and three in the second. State has so far sent two officers to the first course (none to the second) neither of whom is slated to be a Narcotics Coordinator. Customs has sent 15 officers to each of the first two courses, yet they have only 25 overseas slots, presently all manned. None of the Customs officers in the first two courses know when or whether they will be going overseas. Thus, if the course frequency and enrollment rate continues in this pattern, by the end of 1973 there will be some 75 Customs officers stockpiled for the future. Questioned about the utility of this, the Customs representative said they may be getting more overseas slots, but even if they don't, the training will still be valuable for those officers going out on survey teams under the aegis of the CCINC. Barring some rationalization of enrollment procedures or a significant expansion of Customs slots overseas, this course can well become mainly a "futures" course for Customs officers, with a curriculum which probably

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

has a fairly short shelf life. The plan of future runnings of this course is appended as Attachment F.

25X1

  
Chief, Operations School/TR

**Distribution:**

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 - C/NARCOG  
1 - DC/OS/ST  
2 - C/OS/TR

**CONFIDENTIAL**